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APPELLEE BLANDING CITY'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
Defendant Blanding City, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby petitions this Court for a
rehearing.

The basis for this petition is that the Court of

Appeal's decision in Laws v. Blanding City. No. 941415-CA, slip
op. (Utah App. April 4, 1995) (attached hereto as exhibit A), is
inconsistent with well-settled Utah law requiring a party to
object to a trial court's failure to give a jury instruction in
order to assign error for such omission on appeal. Moreover,
Jury Instruction No. 17 correctly states Utah law under English
v. Kienke. 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993) , and was therefore proper.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Melvin Laws was injured when he fell from a
dumping platform at the Blanding City Dump.

In November 1991,

plaintiff initiated this action against defendant Blanding City,
alleging that his injuries were caused by defendant's negligence
in the construction and maintenance of the dump.
In February 1994, this case was tried to a jury.

The trial

judge gave both counsel a copy of his proposed jury instructions
at the close of the parties' presentation of evidence.

Plaintiff

objected to Jury Instruction No. 17. Significantly, however,
plaintiff did not ask the trial court to include a Jury
Instruction regarding defendant's duty as set forth in section
343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Nor did plaintiff
object to the trial court's failure to give such a jury
instruction.

The court charged the jury as proposed, including
- 1 -

Instruction No. 17. Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict
finding defendant not negligent.
Plaintiff appealed this ruling to the Utah Court of Appeals,
contending that the trial court committed prejudicial error in
giving Instruction No. 17. Jury Instruction No. 17 is taken
substantially verbatim from the Restatement (Second) of Torts §
343 (1965), which delineates the duty a possessor of land owes to
an invitee.

Jury Instruction No. 17 reads:

Blanding City is subject to liability
for physical harm caused to Melvin Laws by a
dangerous condition at the Blanding City Dump
if, but only if, Blanding City (a) knew of
the dangerous condition or by the exercise of
reasonable care should have discovered the
dangerous condition, and should have realized
that the dangerous condition involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to Melvin Laws, and
(b) should expect that Melfvin] Laws will not
discover or realize the danger or would fail
to protect himself against it, and (c)
Blanding City then failed to exercise
reasonable care to protect Melvin Laws from
the dangerous condition.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court's
decision.

Agreeing with plaintiff, the Court concluded that

section 343 of the Restatement of Torts, which Instruction No. 17
was taken substantially verbatim from, should be read together
with section 343A of that Restatement, which purportedly
clarifies defendant's duty.

Thus, the court concluded, Jury

Instruction No. 17 alone was an incomplete statement of
defendant's duty because an instruction regarding section 343A of
the Restatement should also have been given.
2-7.
- 2 -

Laws, slip op. at

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF DID NOT PROPERLY OBJECT BELOW
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 51 provides, "No party may
assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction
unless he [or she] objects thereto."

Utah R. Civ. P. 51

(emphasis added); see Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682
P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984).

Under Rule 51 and the attending case

law, it is error for the Court of Appeals to reverse the trial
court's decision on the basis that a jury instruction concerning
the duties set forth in Section 343A was not given.

This is

because plaintiff failed to propose any such instruction and did
not object to the trial court's failure to give any such
instruction. -'
If an objection is not made regarding the failure to give a
jury instruction, the issue is deemed to be waived on appeal.
VanDyke v. Mountain Coin Mach. Distribs., Inc., 758 P.2d 962, 965
(Utah App. 1988).

It is well-settled in Utah that a party cannot

assign error in the omission of an instruction that he or she
failed to request at trial.

State v. Valdez. 432 P.2d 53, 54

17

The grounds for any objection to failure to give a jury
instruction must be distinctly and specifically stated on the
record. VanDyke v. Mountain Coin Mach. Distribs.. Inc., 758 P.2d
962, 964 (Utah App. 1988); Beehive Medical Elec., Inc. v. Square
D Co., 669 P.2d 859, 860 (Utah 1983). The requirement of a
specific objection on the record ensures that the trial court
will understand the basis of the objections and have an
opportunity to correct any errors before the case goes to the
jury. VanDyke. 758 P.2d at 964; State v. Kazda. 545 P.2d 190,
192-93 (Utah 1976).
- 3 -

(Utah 1967).

Indeed,

lf

[w]here no instruction was requested,

there is no error in failing to give it.11

State v. Villiard, 494

P.2d 285, 287 n.6 (Utah 1972) (citing Valdez. 432 P.2d 53).
Accordingly, "the standard rule is that when a party fails to
make a proper objection to an erroneous instruction, or to
present to the court a proper request to supply any claimed
deficiency in the instructions, he [or she] is thereafter
precluded from contending error."

State v. Kazda. 545 P.2d 190,

192 (Utah 1976) (footnotes omitted).

See also Redevelopment

Agency of Salt Lake City v. Barrutia. 526 P.2d 47 (Utah 1974);
Valdez, 432 P.2d 53; State v. Peterson. 240 P.2d 504 (Utah 1952).
In the present case, plaintiff did not request a jury
instruction regarding the substance of section 343A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.

Nor did plaintiff object to the

trial court's failure to give a jury instruction regarding the
substance of section 343A.

Thus, as argued by defense counsel at

oral argument, there can be no error in failing to give an
instruction regarding section 343A as no such instruction was
requested and no objection was raised concerning its omission.
Villiard. 494 P.2d at 827.
The Court of Appeal's determination that plaintiff properly
objected to the trial court's giving of Jury Instruction No. 17
is insufficient to preserve for appeal the issue of the trial
court's failure to give an instruction regarding the contents of
section 343A of the Restatement.

See Laws, slip op. p. 2-3 n.2.

Plaintiff's objection to the giving of Instruction No. 17, which
- 4 -

concerns section 343 of the Restatement, is wholly separate from
the court's failure to include an instruction regarding section
343A of the Restatement.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in overturning the
trial court's decision in the Laws case on the basis that a jury
instruction regarding the substance of section 343A was not
given.

Plaintiff did not object to this omission before the

trial court and thus failed to preserve this issue for appeal.
VanDyke. 758 P.2d at 964. The trial court in this case was not
given the opportunity to consider giving a jury instruction
regarding section 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, nor
did it have the opportunity to correct any claimed error before
the case went to the jury.

Without reversal of the Court of

Appeal's opinion, plaintiff will have successfully challenged on
appeal the trial court's failure to give a jury instruction
without having objected to such failure or having requested such
an instruction, contrary to Utah law.
POINT II.
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 PROPERLY STATES UTAH
LAW UNDER ENGLISH V. KIENKE
As the Court of Appeals acknowledges, the general rule as to
a landowner's liability in Utah is set forth in English v.
Kienke, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993).

Relying on the Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 343, the court in English identified the
areas in which a possessor of land owes a duty of reasonable

- 5 -

care.-

Id. at 156.

This excerpt from English identifying the

duty owed by a possessor of land is virtually identical to Jury
Instruction No. 17. Jury Instruction No. 17 is therefore a
correct statement of defendants duty under Utah law as set forth
in English.
Although section 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
343A may clarify defendant's duty, it is not the Utah law
regarding a landowner's duty of care.

Restatements are not law.

Moreover, section 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts has
not been adopted in Utah.

Indeed, the Court of Appeal's decision

in Laws was the first occasion on which a Utah court has held
that section 343A contains a correct statement of a land
possessor's duty owed to an invitee.
Therefore, taken as a whole, the Jury Instruction No. 17
fully advised the jury on the appropriate standard for
determining defendant's duty of care to the jury under Utah law
and was thus proper.

-

Those areas are:
A possessor of land is subject to liability
for physical harm caused to his [or her]
invitees by a condition on the land if, but
only if, he [or she] (a) knows or by the
exercise of reasonable care would discover
the condition, and should realize that it
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such
invitees, and (b) should expect that they
will not discover or realize the danger, or
will fail to protect themselves against it,
and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to
protect them against the danger.
English, 848 P.2d at 156 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §
343) .
- 6 -

CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully requests the court to reconsider its
decision in the Laws case as it is incorrect under Utah law.

Specifically,

it was error

to overturn

the trial

court's

decision

on the basis that a jury instruction concerning the contents of
section 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was not given
because plaintiff failed present such an instruction to the trial
court and importantlyt failed to object to any such omission of
this instruction,

in addition, Jury Instruction No. 17 properly

stated Utah law as set forth in English v. Kienke. 848 P.2d 153
(Utah 1993).

Accordingly, the Court of Appeal's decision should

be reconsidered in order to correct these errors.
DATED this . jH

day of April, 1995.
WILLIAMS & HUNT

^j^U^-^^^

By

CAROLYN S. JENSEN
Attorneys for Appellee
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EXHIBIT A

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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COURT OF APPEALS
OPINION
(For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v,

Case No. 940415-CA

Blanding City,
F I L E D
( A p r i l 4 , 1995)

Defendant and Appellee.

Seventh District, San Juan County
The Honorable Lyle R. Anderson
Attorneys:

Darwin C. Fisher, Provo, for Appellant
Gary B. Ferguson, Salt lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Onne.
BILLINGS, Judge:
Melvin Laws (Plaintiff) challenges a jury verdict that
Blandmg City (Defendant) was not negligent in the construction
and maintenance of the Blanding City Dump. We reverse and
remand.
FACTS
After falling from a dumping platform at the Blanding City
Dump, Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendant, alleging
his injuries were caused by Defendant's negligence in the
construction and maintenance of the dump. The case was tried to
a jury in February 1994. Prior to trial, Plaintiff and Defendant
submitted to the trial court their respective requested jury
instructions. At the close of the parties' presentation of
evidence and outside the presence of the jury, the trial judge
gave counsel a copy of the instructions he proposed to give and
returned the parties' requested jury instructions to them with
his notations as to which would be given and which would not.
Plaintiff took exception to the court's proposed Instruction No.
17, which set forth the duty Defendant owed Plaintiff. The court
overruled the objection.

Thereafter, the court charged the jury as proposed, and the
jury returned a verdict that Defendant was not negligent.
Plaintiff appeals, contending the trial court committed
prejudicial error in giving Instruction No. IT.1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Determining the propriety of jury instructions presents a
question of law, which we review under a correction of error
standard. Anes v. Haas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993). We
review jury instructions ir. their entirety to determine whether
the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on
the applicable law. Id. "We reverse a trial court's decision on
the basis of an instruction improperly submitted to the jury only
where the party challenging the propriety of tae instruction
*demonstrates prejudice stemming from the instructions viewed in
the aggregate.'11 Id. (quoting State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 931
(Utah App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 846 ?.2d 1276 (Utah
1993)) .
ANALYSIS
In support of his claim of error, Plaintiff argues that
Instruction No. 17 is an incomplete and misleading statement of
Defendant's duty.2
1. Because ve reverse on this claim of error, we do not reach
Plaintiff's additional claim of error, namely, that the trial
court abused its discretion by excluding Plaintiff's expert
witness in order to sanction Plaintiff for noncompliance with a
scheduling order. We note, however, that the reasons for the
trial court's sanction would seem to disappear on remand.
2. At oral argument, Defendant raised for the first time the
issue of waiver, claiming Plaintiff did not adequately object to
Instruction No. 17 and therefore cannot now complain about its
insufficiency. Pursuant to our rules of civil procedure, "[n]o
party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an
instruction unless he objeots thereto. In objecting to the
giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the
matter to which he objects and the grounds for his objection.'1
Utah R. Civ. P. 51; see also Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft S Co., 622
P.2d 1168, 1175 (Utah 1980 (holding defendant's assignment of
error failed because, in taxing exception to instruction,
defendant had not specified claimed error); VanDvke v. Mountain
Coin Mach. Distribs., Inc., 758 P.2d 962, 964 (Utah App. 1988)
(continued...)
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Instruction No. 17 reads in its entirety:
Blanding City is subject to liability
for physical harm caused to Melvin Laws by a
dangerous condition at the Blanding City Dump
if, but only if, Blanding City (a) knew of
the dangerous condition or by the exercise of
reasonable care should have discovered the
dangerous condition, and should have realized
that the dangerous condition involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to Melvin Laws, and
(b) should expect that Melfvin] Laws will not
discover or realize the danger or would fail
to protect himself against it, and (c)
Blanding City then failed to exercise
reasonable care to protect Melvin Laws rrom
the dangerous condition.
Plaintiff asserts that subsection (b), which refers to whether
Plaintiff should have realized the danger or protected himself
against it, creates the misleading impression that if Plaintiff
did not do so, Defendant's duty is abrogated.
Jury Instruction No. 17 is taken substantially verbatim from
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965), which delineates
the duty a possessor of land owes to an invitee. Plaintiff
2. (...continued)
("If a party fails to object to a jury instruction, the objection
is deemed waived on appeal.").
In the present case, our review of the record reveals that
the parties and the trial court, pursuant to Defendant's motion
for directed verdict, discussed at length the proper standard of
care with which to charge the jury. Defendant argued that "if
the hazard is open and obvious and the type that Blanding City
reasonably would believe people would avoid, then Blanding City
has no duty to do anything." Plaintiff, on the other hand,
argued that "there is a duty on the part of government to . . .
take reasonable care to . . . ensure the safety of those that use
their facilities, in this case, the dump." Moreover, Plaintiff
submitted requested instructions to the court which, although not
a perfect statement of the applicable duty, omitted the portion
of Instruction No. 17 about which he now complains. When
Plaintiff took exception to the trial court's proposed
instructions, he referenced the prior discussion, as well as his
proffered instructions, and the trial court overruled the
exception "for the reasons stated[] when I ruled on the motion
for directed verdict." We thus conclude that Plaintiff has
properly preserved this claim.

940415-CA
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concedes section 343 is a correct statement of Defendant's duty,
but argues that it is not a complete statement of that duty and
must be read together with section 343A.
We agree. The correct statement of the duty Defendant, a
possessor of land, owed Plaintiff, an invitee, is contained in
sections 3 43 and 3 43A of the Restatement. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 343 cmt. a (1965) ("This Section should be
read together with § 3 4 3A, which deals with the effect of the
fact that the condition is known to the invitee, or is obvious to
him, as well as the fact that the invitee is a patron of a public
utility."); English v. Kienke. 848 P.2d 153, 156 (Utah 1993)
(stating duty of possessor of land to invitee is set forth in
§ 343 and § 343A).
Section 343A reads, in its entirety:
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his
invitees for physical harm caused to them by
an activity or condition on the land whose
danger is known or obvious to them, unless
the possessor should anticipate the harm
despite such knowledge or obviousness.
(2) In determining whether the possessor
should anticipate harm from a known or
obvious danger, the fact that the invitee is
entitled to make use of public land, or of
the facilities of a public utility, is a
factor of importance indicating the harm
should be anticipated.
Restatement, supra, § 3 4 3A (emphasis added).
section 343A reads:

Comment f to

There are . . . cases in which the
possessor of land can and should anticipate
that the dangerous condition will cause
physical harm to the invitee notwithstanding
its known or obvious danger. In such cases
the possessor is not relieved of the duty of
reasonable care which he owes to the invitee
for his protection. This duty may require
him to warn the invitee, or to take other
reasonable steps to protect him, against the
known or obvious condition or activity, if
the possessor has reason to expect that the
invitee will nevertheless suffer physical
harm.

940415-CA
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Such reason to expect harm to the
visitor from known or obvious dangers may
arise, for example, where the possessor has
reason to expect . . . that the invitee will
proceed to encounter the known or obvious
danger because to a reasonable man in his
position the advantages of doing so would
outweigh the apparent risk. In such cases
the' fact that the danger is known, or is
obvious, is important in determining whether
the invitee is to be charged with
contributory negligence, or assumption of
risk. . . . It is not, however, conclusive
in determining the duty of the possessor, or
whether he has acted reasonably under the
circumstances.
Id. cmt. f.

Further, comment g states:

In determining whether the possessor of
land should expect harm to invitees
notwithstanding the known or obvious
character of the danger, the fact that
premises have been held open to the visitor,
and that he has been invited to use them, is
always a factor to be considered, as offering
some assurance to the invitee that the place
has been prepared for his reception, and that
reasonable care has been used to make it
safe. There is, however, a special reason
for the possessor to anticipate harm where
the possessor is a public utility, which has
undertaken to render services to members of
the public, so that they are entitled to
demand the use of its facilities, and to
expect reasonable safety while using them.
The same is true of the government, or a
government agency, which maintains land upon
which the public are invited and entitled to
enter as a matter of public right. Such
defendants may reasonably expect the public,
in the course of the entry and use to which
they are entitled, to proceed to encounter
some known or obvious dangers which are not
undulv extreme, rather than to forego the
right.
Id. cmt. g (emphasis added).

940415-CA
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We hold that the trial court erred in giving Instruction No.
17 to the jury as it is an incomplete and thus misleading
statement of Defendant's duty. Plaintiff has the right to have
his theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and
understandable way, and the trial court has a duty to instruct
the jury on the applicable law. Ames, 846 P.2d at 471. Section
343A substantially clarifies the duty Defendant, as both a public
utility and a government entity, owes Plaintiff, a member of the
public for whom the land Defendant possesses is held open. It
also relates precisely to Plaintiff's theory of the case, which
is that Plaintiff, who resides outside a public garbage pickup
area and is required by ordinance to dispose of his garbage
himself (or subscribe to a garbage pickup service), had no choice
but to approach the thirty-foot precipice at the dump in order to
throw his garbage over it. In these circumstances, Plaintiff
claims, Defendant had a duty to protect Plaintiff because it
should have known that a reasonable person would, recognizing the
danger, nevertheless encounter it. See Donahue v. Purfee. 780
P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah App. 1989).
Moreover, we disagree with Defendant that the proffered
comparative negligence instruction, together with the special
verdict form, cured the deficiency in Instruction No. 17. If the
jury determined that Defendant owed no duty of reasonable care to
Plaintiff based on the incomplete statement of duty found in
Instruction No. 17, then neither the comparative negligence
instruction nor the special verdict form would have been helpful.
fl
[T]here would be no negligence to compare—and, therefore, no
recovery" if Defendant's duty were erroneously excused because
the danger is known or obvious. See id. at 1279. We conclude
that the instructions as a whole inadequately presented the law
with respect to Defendant's duty of care and undermined
Plaintiff's ability to present his theory of the case to the
jury.
We must next determine whether the error was prejudicial.
To require a new trial, we must conclude not only that the trial
court erred, but that the error was prejudicial, that is, "that
it ^endfed] to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the
complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advise[d] the
jury on the law.'" Summerill v. Shipley, 259 Utah Adv. Rep. 19,
20 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 88
(Utah App. 1987)). Moreover, the jury's application of an
erroneous duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff is, in all but
the clearest cases, necessarily prejudicial. Id. at 20-21.
We have in this case an unusual insight into the jury's
deliberative process. Midway through deliberations, the jury
asked the trial court the following question: "Judge, the
majority of us feel that both parties are at fault to some

940415-CA
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extent. Therefore, would it be allcvable to compensate Mr. Laws
a monetary amount for pain and suffering incurred for his
injuries? If so, how can we go about this?" After conferring
with counsel on both sides, the court sent back the following
response: "The answer to this question is in the jury
instructions and the special verdict form." The jury thereafter
returned with a verdict. In response to special verdict question
no. 1—"Was the defendant, Blanding City, negligent as alleged by
the plaintiff?"—the jury stated, curiously in view of their
inquiry, "No."
Given these facts, we cannot say the jury was not misled by
Instruction No. 17's incomplete statement of Defendant's duty.
Rather, Instruction No. 17 may well have led the jury to
erroneously conclude that, because Plaintiff should have realized
the dangerous condition at the dump and protected himself against
it, Defendant owed Plaintiff no duty of care. Accordingly, we
conclude that Plaintiff was prejudiced, and we reverse and remand
for a new trial.

Judith M. Billings, Judge

940415-CA
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